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Optimal Contracts and Investment in General 







This paper studies contracts and incentives to invest in general human capital under 
common agency. Both the worker and the employer have too weak investment incentives in 
equilibrium. The employer’s underinvestment results from his failure to internalize the 
positive impact of his investment on other firms’ productivity as well as from the fact that 
he gives a share of output to the worker in order to induce a higher effort contribution. The 
worker anticipates that she will not be the full residual claimant of benefits and underinvests 
in equilibrium, too. A benevolent government will choose a set of subsidies such that the 
worker’s investment relative to the employer is equal to the first-best relative investment 
intensity. If the number of employers is small, then the worker’s investment level is 
relatively low and the government must give a relatively higher subsidy to the worker in 
order to stimulate her investment incentives.   
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In his seminal contribution to the debate over the provision of human capital, Becker (1964) 
predicts that the employer will make zero investment in his employees’ general skills if the 
labor market is perfectly competitive. The rationale behind this theoretical conclusion 
(which, however, contrasts with empirical evidence) is that competition between employers 
to attract the trained worker enables the latter to reap all productivity benefits associated 
with acquired general skills. The incumbent employer anticipates that he will not be able to 
recoup the cost of investment and, therefore, is unwilling to make any investment at all. In 
this framework, the worker faces first-best incentives to invest in her own general human 
capital since she is the full residual claimant of associated benefits (i.e. she has all the 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer, who receives zero expected profits).  
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The more recent economic literature on the provision of general skills (Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1998, 1999a, 1999b) departs from the assumption of perfect competition between 
employers in the labor market. The introduction of frictions in the labor market implies a 
pattern of wage compression (in the sense that the marginal effect of general training on 
worker’s wage is lower than the marginal effect on productivity). As a result, the employer 
will now be willing to make some positive but still inefficiently low investment in general 
human capital. Again, the (however imperfect) competition between employers pushes the 
worker’s outside wage upwards and forces the incumbent employer to pay a higher wage in 
order to keep his employee from moving to another firm. The employer anticipates that the 
worker will be able to extract a proportion of the additional surplus and thus has too weak 
investment incentives relative to the socially optimal outcome
1. 
 
This paper tries to study general training in a unified framework by allowing both the 
employer and the worker to invest in human capital. We use a common agency setting in 
which the worker can be employed by multiple firms at the same time and thus must decide 
how to distribute her effort between them. One of these employers also makes an investment 
in general human capital after having observed the worker’s investment choice. Given these 
choices, each employer offers a contract to the worker, linking the latter’s wage 
compensation with output realization in the respective firm. After observing the set of 
contract offers, the worker chooses the (nonverifiable) level of effort contributions and 
output is realized in each firm. We study the properties of subgame perfect equilibrium in 
comparison to the first-best outcome.  
 
The equilibrium allocation involves underprovision of effort to all firms. This is a typical 
result of models incorporating moral hazard and can be attributed to the standard tradeoff 
between limited liability and efficiency (see e.g. Laffont and Martimort 2002, Ch. 4). Since 
the agent is constrained by limited liability, the principal cannot impose a severe enough 
punishment for the case of low output realization. Therefore, the equilibrium contract 
involves too weak wage incentives and implements a suboptimally low level of effort. 
Furthermore, it is shown that both the worker and the employer underinvest in general 
human capital (relative to the first-best). The prediction of employer’s underinvestment is in 
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line with findings in the previous literature but has a different explanation here: First, the 
investing employer does not internalize the positive external effect of his investment on 
other firms’ productivity. Second, the presence of moral hazard implies that the employer 
has to give a share of output to the worker in the form of a wage necessary to implement a 
higher level of effort. Therefore, the net social benefit exceeds the employer’s private 
benefit from investment, implying that the latter has too weak investment incentives in 
equilibrium.  
 
On the other hand, the worker also does not internalize the full positive impact of her 
investment on firms’ productivity and thus commits herself to a suboptimally low level of 
investment, too. Since there is no perfect competition between employers in the labor 
market (i.e. employers receive more than zero expected profits in equilibrium), the worker 
anticipates that she will not be able to extract all productivity benefits and thus has too weak 
investment incentives in the first place. In this context, it is shown that the worker’s 
willingness to invest (relative to the employer) in equilibrium is increasing in the number of 
firms as well as in output elasticity with respect to worker’s effort and investment but can be 
either increasing or decreasing in output elasticity with respect to employer’s investment. 
 
A standard question addressed in the related literature concerns the appropriate policy 
instrument to alleviate inefficiencies associated with human capital investment. In this 
context, the original game is modified by assuming a government which chooses the set of 
investment subsidies in order to maximize social welfare. In the new equilibrium outcome, 
the government chooses a set of subsidies such that the worker’s investment relative to the 
employer equals the first-best relative investment intensity. If the number of firms in the 
market is small enough, then the worker’s investment incentives are relatively weak in the 
original equilibrium and the government must give a higher subsidy to the worker than to 
the employer in order to stimulate the former’s investment level. 
 
The seminal contribution to the debate over common agency has been made by Bernheim 
and Whinston (1986). More recent applications and further contributions to common agency 
theory include Dixit et al (1996), Peters (2001), Attar et al (2007) or Martimort and Stole 
(2009). 
 
The rest of the paper has the following structure: In Section 2, we introduce the basic model 
and in Section 3 we calculate the first-best allocation, which is used as a benchmark 
outcome thereafter. In Section 4, we compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of the   4
associated game and in Section 5 we study the implications of this equilibrium outcome in 
comparison to the first-best. In Section 6, we study the optimal subsidization policy chosen 
by a government that seeks to maximize social welfare. Finally, Section 7 provides some 
concluding remarks and outlines possible directions for future research.  
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider an economy which consists of n+1 agents: one worker (A) and n employers 
(P1,…,Pn). There is one consumption good (x) produced according to the technology 
specified below. The worker can be employed by all principals and contributes effort to 
each firm for the production of the consumption good
2. Both the worker and the first 
employer (P1) can invest in general human capital. We assume the following production 
technology for each firm: 
 
               1 o HI I
β δ       , with probability  min{ ,1} ii pe
α =  
  i x =                                                                                                                                       (1) 
                  0           , with probability 1 – pi  
   
where xi denotes the output produced in firm  i =1,…,n and  ei≥0 denotes the level of effort 
contributed to firm i. Furthermore, Io (I1) represents the level of investment in general 
training made by the worker (employer 1), where Io, I1≥0. We also assume that the total 
factor productivity is H>0 and α+β+δ<1. The latter assumption guarantees that the 
production function is strictly concave. The values of parameters α,β,δ>0  represent output 
elasticities with respect to inputs ei , Io and I1 respectively. Finally, agents’ preferences are 
represented by the following utility functions: 
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where xA denotes A’s consumption, xPi denotes employer i’s consumption (i=1,…,n), γ>0 
represents the marginal disutility of labor and θ>0   represents the marginal cost of 
investment
3.   
 
 
                                                 
2 The distribution of worker’s nonverifiable effort among different tasks and principals implies a common 
agency setting. 
3 For simplicity, it is assumed here that both the worker and employer 1 face the same marginal cost of 
investment in general human capital. The relaxation of this assumption does not qualitatively affect the results 
presented below.    5
3. The First-Best Outcome 
Since all agents in the economy are risk-neutral, the first-best allocation can be found by the 
maximization of aggregate surplus (i.e. the sum of agents’ expected utilities) subject to 
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The above problem can be written equivalently: 
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It should be noted that the first-best outcome always involves  1 i e ≤ , since any increase in ei 
beyond one is costly for society but yields no social benefits (pi=1 for all ei>1). The 
objective function is concave and the set of constraints is convex, implying that the (Kuhn-
Tucker) necessary conditions are also sufficient for maximization. We write the Lagrangian 
and the first-order conditions: 
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Proposition 1. The first-best outcome involves 00 11 ,
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In what follows, we assume γ γ ≥   – i.e. we assume that the first-best allocation is given by 
the interior solution of the above problem (the second branch of (2)). 
  
4. The Second-Best Outcome: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium  
 
In the second-best environment, the worker’s effort contribution ei to each firm is 
nonverifiable and thus noncontractible. The sequence of moves in the associated game is the 
following:  
- At stage 1, the worker A chooses her investment in general human capital (I0).  
 
- At stage 2, employer 1 (P1) also makes an investment (I1) in general training after having 
observed I0. 
 
- At stage 3, all employers simultaneously offer a wage contract to the worker. Each wage 
contract is contingent on output realized in the respective firm. In particular, the wage 
structure has the following form: 
                      i h       , if  01 i x HI I
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The assumption that the agent is constrained by limited liability implies  , 0 ii hl≥ . 
Furthermore, the constraint  ( ) ii i wx x ≤  (i.e. the requirement of nonnegative profitability for 
each firm) implies  0 i l ≤ . Therefore, we can immediately set  0 i l =  and conclude that the 
contract offer made by employer i is represented by  hi. 
 
- At stage 4, the worker A chooses her effort contribution ei to each firm i. Then, the output 
level xi is realized in each firm, wage compensations are paid and the game ends. 
 
We use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. At stage 
4, the worker chooses her effort contribution to each firm (ei) so as to maximize her 
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It should be noted that the worker will never choose ei>1, because any choice of effort level 
greater than one involves labor disutility without yielding any benefit to her (pi=1 for all 
ei>1). Therefore, we can focus on the interval 0 1 i e ≤ ≤ . 
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The solution of these conditions yields the following stage-4 outcome: 
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At stage 3, employers P1,…,Pn simultaneously offer contracts h1,…,hn respectively to the 
worker so as to maximize their expected profits (given I0, I1 and anticipating ei as given in 
(4)). Consider the case where  / i h γ α ≥  first. Then, Pi’s expected payoff is: 
01 01 () Pii ii EUH I I h e H I I h
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The maximization of this payoff under the constraint  / i h γ α ≥ obviously yields the solution 
hi= γ/α. This means that Pi never has an inventive to set  / i h γ α >  and we can focus on the 
case where  / i h γ α ≤  to write Pi’s maximization problem as: 
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 where  the  constraint  0 i h ≥  is due to worker’s limited liability, (IC) is the worker’s 
incentive compatibility constraint and (PC) is the worker’s participation constraint
4. We 
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We use (5) to rewrite each employer’s problem (PPi) and solve it with respect to ei instead 
of hi: 
01 {} max /
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We write the Lagrangian and the first-order conditions for maximization: 
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The solution of these conditions yields the following stage-3 outcome: 
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βδ α θ =− −  but the additional term does not 
affect the choice of contract and thus can be omitted at this stage for notational simplicity.   9
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From (5) and (6) we obtain the set of optimal contract offers (given I0 and I1): 
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Since effort contributions and contracts are symmetric, we can write  i ee =  and  i hh =  
hereafter. It should be noted that wage incentives (and effort contributions) increase with the 
level of investment made by the worker (I0) and the employer (I1) at previous stages of the 
interaction. Any increase in human capital investment induces employers to implement 
higher levels of effort by giving stronger wage incentives to the worker
5.   
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At stage 2, P1 chooses his level of investment I1 (given I0 and anticipating h, e as given in 
(6), (7)) so as to maximize his expected payoff. The appropriate series of calculations 
(which can be found in the Appendix) yields the following stage-2 outcome:  
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It should be noted from (9a) and (9b) that the principal is more willing to invest in general 
human capital given a higher level of investment by the worker, because any increase in I0 
also increases the marginal productivity of I1.  
The solution (9a) implies: 
                                                 
5 It can be easily verified that the solution (7) also satisfies the nonnegative profitability constraint:
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Similarly, the solution (9b) implies: 
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We proceed backwards to stage 1, where the worker A chooses the level of investment (I0) 
to maximize her expected payoff (anticipating I1, e, h as given in (9), (10) and (11)).  
For
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The objective function of the problem is concave with respect to I0 (for α+β+δ<1). We 
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The solution is: 
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We have already assumed that 
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It is easy to verify that the last inequality always holds for  2, n ≥ α+β+δ<1 and α,β,δ>0. 
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We substitute (12) into (9a) to get: 
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Finally, we use (12) and (13) to compute the equilibrium effort contributions and contract 
offers summarized in Proposition 2 below. 
Proposition 2. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is: 
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We proceed with a series of comparisons between the first-best and equilibrium levels of 
investment and effort. First, we have: 
*1 1
00 (1 ) /(1 )
FB II n
δ αδ δ α αδ α
−− − <⇔ > − − − , which is always true for  2, n ≥ α+β+δ<1 and 
α,β,δ>0. This means that the worker underinvests in general training relative to the first-
best. Similarly: 
*1
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−− + <⇔ > − − − , which is always true for  2, n ≥ α+β+δ<1 and 
α,β,δ>0. This means that the employer also underinvests in general training. Finally:   12
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δ βδ α αδα
− <⇔ > − − − , which is again true for all parameter values. In 
other words, there is inefficiently low provision of effort in equilibrium relative to the first-
best (i.e. the wage incentives 
* h offered by employers are too weak to implement the 
socially optimal level of effort). These results are summarized in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3.  
(a) In the subgame perfect equilibrium, both the worker and the employer underinvest in 
general human capital relative to the first-best. Therefore, the overall investment in the 
economy is suboptimally low. 
(b) In the subgame perfect equilibrium, there is underprovision of effort relative to the first-
best. In other words, the contracts offered by employers give too weak incentives to the 
worker. 
 
The underprovision of effort by the worker is a hardly surprising result which can be 
attributed to the standard tradeoff between limited liability and efficiency. Since the worker 
is constrained by limited liability, employers cannot impose a severe enough punishment for 
the case of low output realization. As a result, wage incentives are too weak and implement 
inefficiently low levels of effort in equilibrium.  
 
The employer’s underinvestment fits well the standard predictions of the related literature 
but has a different explanation here. First, the employer does not internalize the positive 
external effect of his investment on other firms’ productivity. Second, the presence of moral 
hazard implies that the employer must give part of the produced output to the worker in the 
form of an incentive scheme that induces a higher level of effort. Therefore, the employer 
cannot reap the full positive impact of his investment on his own firm’s productivity. As a 
result, he has too weak investment incentives in equilibrium (i.e. the net social benefit 
exceeds the employer’s net private benefit from investment in general human capital). On 
the other hand, the worker also has too weak investment incentives because neither she is 
the full residual claimant of investment benefits. Since there is no perfect competition 
between employers in the labor market, the produced output in each firm is divided between 
the employer and the worker. The latter anticipates this distribution of benefits and chooses 
an inefficiently low level of investment in the first place.  
 
From (14), it is easy to see that: 
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As the number of firms increases, the worker’s investment is more likely to be higher than 
the employer’s investment in equilibrium (e.g. for α=β=δ=1/4 we have 
**
01 I I >  for  3 n ≥ ). 
More generally, we can define the worker’s relative investment intensity as  01 / rII ≡ . Then, 
we can use (2) to find that the first-best relative investment intensity is 
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This expression can be used to state the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4.  The worker’s relative investment intensity in equilibrium is: 
 (i) Increasing in the number of firms:
* /0 rn ∂ ∂>. 
(ii) Increasing in output elasticity with respect to worker’s investment:
* /0 r β ∂ ∂>. 
(iii) Increasing in output elasticity with respect to worker’s effort: 
* /0 r α ∂ ∂>. 
(iv) Decreasing (increasing) in output elasticity with respect to employer’s investment for 
low (high) values of this elasticity:  
* 1










A stronger positive impact of worker’s effort on output (i.e. a higher value of α) makes the 
worker relatively more willing to invest in human capital. Furthermore, a stronger positive 
impact of employer’s investment on output (i.e. a higher value of δ) also increases the 
worker’s investment incentives relatively more than the employer’s investment incentives 
for high values of δ. In other words, as the employer’s investment becomes highly 
productive the worker becomes more willing to invest relative to the employer.  
 
6. Optimal Subsidization Policy 
This section studies the optimal set of subsidies given by a benevolent government to the 
worker and employer who invest in general training. The original interaction is now 
enriched by assuming an initial stage where the social planner optimally chooses the set of 
subsidies in order to maximize social welfare. In particular, we assume that the worker 
receives a subsidy so per unit of investment Io, while the investing employer receives a 
subsidy s1 per unit of I1. These subsidies are paid by the worker as a lump-sum tax T
6. 
Therefore, the government faces the following budget constraint: 
 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, it could be assumed that the cost of the subsidization policy is paid by the firms as a lump-sum 
tax or any other tax scheme that maintains a balanced government budget.   14
00 11 sI sI T +=                                                                                                                       (15) 
 
The new set of players’ expected payoffs is the following: 
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We use backward induction to find the new subgame perfect equilibrium. At the last stage, 
the worker’s problem has the same solution with the one calculated in (4). In turn, the 
employers offer the set of contracts and implement the set of effort levels given in (7) and 
(6), respectively. Anticipating these effort contributions, the employer P1 chooses I1 to 
maximize his expected payoff. The solution of the associated program now is: 
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Given s0, s1 and T, the worker chooses Io to maximize her expected payoff. As before, we 
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We can use this solution to get I1, h and e as functions of s0 and s1: 
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Now, we can write all players’ expected payoffs as a function of so, s1 and T: 
                                                 
7 In what follows, we focus on the interior solution involving ei<1. Indeed, only this solution is relevant under 
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, j=2,…,n. 
At the first stage, the government chooses the set of subsidies s0 and s1 so as to maximize 
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The solution of these conditions yields the set of optimal subsidies
8: 
                                                 
8 It can be shown that the second-order conditions for maximization also hold in this case.   16
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Finally, we can substitute this solution into (17), (18), (19) and (20) to get the equilibrium 
outcome summarized in the following proposition: 
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We can now study the implications of this equilibrium. First, we compare the new 





















































It is easy to verify that these inequalities hold for all values of parameters and state the 
following conclusion: 
Lemma 1. The new equilibrium outcome with subsidies also involves underinvestment by 
the worker and the employer  00 11 (,)
SF B SF B I II I <<  as well as underprovision of effort 
()
SF B ee <  relative to the first-best allocation. 
 
Second, we can compare the worker’s with the employer’s new level of investment to get 
the next result.   17
Lemma 2. (i) In the new equilibrium with subsidies, the worker chooses a higher (lower) 
level of investment than the employer if and only if the elasticity of output with respect to I0 
is higher (lower) than the elasticity of output with respect to I1: 
  01 () ()
SS II β δ >< ⇔ ><  
(ii) The worker’s relative investment intensity in equilibrium with subsidies is equal to the 












== = = 
 
Finally, we can compare the levels of subsidy received by the worker and the employer to 
derive the last result of this section. 
 
Lemma 3. In the new equilibrium with subsidies, we have: 
** * * *
01 0 1 () / () / ss r I Iβ δ >< ⇔ = <>  
In other words, the worker receives a higher (lower) of subsidy than the employer if and 














It is easy to see the intuition behind these findings. As already found in Proposition 4, if 
there is only a small number of firms in the market then the worker’s investment intensity 
(relative to the employer) is low in the original equilibrium allocation. In this case, the 
government optimally chooses to give a relatively higher subsidy to the worker in order to 
strengthen her investment incentives in the new equilibrium. 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we have studied optimal contracts and incentives to invest in general human 
capital under common agency. In the original subgame perfect equilibrium, there is 
underprovision of effort due to the standard tradeoff between limited liability and efficiency, 
which is typically present in models with moral hazard.  It has been shown that both the 
employer and the worker choose an inefficiently low level of investment. The employer’s 
underinvestment results from his failure to internalize the positive impact of his investment 
on other firms’ productivity as well as from the fact that he has to give a share of output to 
the worker in order to induce a higher level of effort. On the other hand, the worker also has 
too weak investment incentives in absence of perfect competition in the labor market. The 
worker anticipates that she will not be the full residual claimant of productivity benefits and   18
chooses a suboptimally low level of investment in the first place. The worker’s relative 
investment intensity is increasing in the number of firms as well as in output elasticity with 
respect to worker’s effort and investment but can be either increasing or decreasing in 
output elasticity with respect to employer’s investment. Furthermore, a benevolent 
government will choose a set of investment subsidies such that the worker’s relative 
investment intensity in the new equilibrium equals the first-best relative investment 
intensity. If the number of firms in the marker is small (large) enough, then the worker’s 
investment level is relatively low (high) in the original equilibrium and the government 
must give a higher (lower) subsidy to the worker than to the employer in order to stimulate 
more the former’s (latter’s) investment incentives. 
 
A natural extension of the model developed here might consider the presence of many 
workers and/or study the case where the number of firms is endogenously determined in the 
market. In another possible extension, the additional assumption that the worker’s ability (as 
well as her effort) is not observable by employers would give a more complete picture of 
inefficiencies associated with informational asymmetries. These extensions are left for 
future research.    
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The objective function is concave with respect to I1 (for α+β+δ<1). We write the 
Lagrangian and the first-order conditions for maximization: 
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The solution is:   19
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Case 2. For 
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≥ , P1’s maximization problem becomes: 
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The Lagrangian and the first-order conditions for maximization are: 
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The derivation of the stage-2 outcome requires comparing the values of EUP1 at solutions 
(9a), (9b), (10a) and (10b) within the appropriate intervals of I0. 
For 
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≤  , we compare the values of EUP1 associated with solutions (9a) 
and (10a) to find: 
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Therefore, the stage-2 outcome is:   20
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